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Mr. Geoffrey Butler
Clerk, Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
RE:

State v. Wesley Tuttle
Case No. 20068

Dear Geoff:
Pursuant to provisions of 24(j) R. Utah S. Ct., appellant
provides the Court with the following information for its
consideration in connection with appellant's Petition for Rehearing
which is currently pending before the Court.
In respondent's Reply to Petition for Rehearing, respondent
asserts that appellant did not refer to pages in the record to
support his points on appeal. This is ludicrous in view of the
fact that appellant's original Brief was replete with references
to the record and the Petition for Rehearing which appellant filed
simply refers to the facts as established and referred to in
appellant's Brief. To suggest that this Court ought not consider
the Petition for Rehearing because appellant failed to refer, once
again, to the record appears to be absolutely incomprehensible.
Furthermore, respondent does not contest the facts referred to by
appellant, but simply says that appellant did not refer to the
record. The facts, as articulated by appellant in the Petition for
Rehearing, were facts established at trial and referenced in
appellant's original Brief to this Court, and this Court ought not
consider the fact that appellant did not refer specifically to the
record in his Petition for Rehearing as any basis at all for
denying his Petition for Rehearing.
A significant case regarding harmless error was decided by
the United States Supreme Court after appellant filed his Petition
for Rehearing, but prior to the time that respondent replied to
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, yet respondent does not make
any reference to that opinion in its response.
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harmless error analysis because it aborted the "basic trial
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the introduction of tainted eye witness testimony harmless. It is
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No. 87-6997

EUGENE JOHN CARELLA, APPELLANT
u CALIFORNIA
ON APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT, SUPERIOR
COURT OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES COUNTY
[June 15, 1989]
PER CURIAM.

On March 24,1986, after a jury trial in the Municipal Court
of Beverly Hills Judicial District, California, Appellant Eugene Carella was convicted of grand theft for failure to return
a rented car.1 At his trial, the court adopted the prosecution's requested instructions applying the statutory presumptions in California Vehicle Code Ann. § 10855 (West 1987),2
and California Penal Code Ann. § 484(b) (West 1988).1 Specifically, over Carella's objection, the court charged the jury
as follows:
;i) "Presumption Respecting Theft by Fraud:
Intent to commit theft by fraud is presumed if one who
has leased or rented the personal property of another pursuant to a written contract fails to return the personal property
to its owner within 20 days after the owner has made written
demand by certified or registered mail following the expiration of the lease or rental agreement for return of the property so leased or rented."
(2) "Presumption Respecting Embezzlement of a Leased
or Rented Vehicle:
"Whenever any person who has leased or rented a vehicle
wilfully and intentionally fails to return the vehicle to its
owner within five days after the lease or rental agreement
has expired, that person shall be presumed to have embezzled the vehicle." App. 15.
On appeal to the Appellate Department of the Superior
Court, the prosecution confessed error, acknowledging that
these two instructions unconstitutionally imposed conclusive presumptions as to core elements of Carella's crime.
The Appellate Department disagreed, however, and validated the presumptions on the ground that Carella "never
offered testimony concerning the nonexistence of the presumed facts
" Id., at 61. This disposition was so plainly
at odds with prior decisions of this Court that we noted probable jurisdiction, 488 U. S.
(1988), and now reverse.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies States the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless
the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358,
364 (1970). Jury instructions relieving States of this burden
violate a defendant's due process rights. See Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U. S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U. S. 510 (1979). Such directions subvert the presumption
1
Carella was acquitted of the charged violation of California Vehicle
Code Ann. § 10851(a) (West 1987), which provides that the nonconsensual
taking or driving of a vehicle is a "public offense" if accomplished with the
specific "intent either to permanently or temporarily" deprive the owner of
title or possession.
1
California Vehicle Code Ann. § 10855 reads: "Whenever any person
who has leased or rented a vehicle wilfully and intentionally fails to return
the vehicle to its owner withinfivedays after the lease or rental agreement
has expired, that person shall be presumed to have embezzled the vehicle."
1
California Penal Code Ann. § 4840?) reads: "Except as provided in Section 10855 of the Vehicle Code, intent to commit theft byfraudis presumed
if one who has leased or rented the personal property of another pursuant
to a written contract fails to return the personal property to its owner
within 20 days after the owner has made written demand by certified or
registered mail following the expiration of the lease or rental agreement
for return of the property so leased or rented."
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of innocence accorded to accused persons, and also invade the
truth-finding task assigned solely to juries in criminal cases.
We explained in Francis and Sandstrom that courts should
ask whether the presumption in/question is mandatory, that
is, whether the specific instruction, both alone and in the context of the overall charge, could have been understood by
reasonable jurors to require them tofindthe presumed fact if
the State proves certain predicate facts. See Sandstrom,
supra, at 514. The ^prosecution understandably does not
now dispute that the instructions in this case were phrased as
commands, for those instructions were explicit and unqualified to that effect and were not explained elsewhere in the
jury charge to be merely permissive. Carella's jury was told
first that a person "shall be presumed^ have embezzled" a
vehicle if it is not returned within five days of the expiration
of the rental agreement;" and second, that "intent to commit
theft by fraud is presumed" from failure to return rented
property within 20 days of demand.
These mandatory directions directly foreclosed independent jury consideration of whether the facts proved established certain elements of the offenses with which Carella
was charged. The instructions also relieved the State of its
burden of proof articulated in Winship, namely proving by
evidence every essential element of Carella's crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. The two instructions violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
The State insists that the error was in any event harmless.
As we have in similar cases, we do not decide that issue here.
In Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, at 515, the jury in a murder case was instructed that the "law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts."
We held that because the jury might have understood the
presumption to be conclusive or as shifting the burden of persuasion, the instruction was constitutional error. There was
a claim of harmless error, however, and even though the jury
might have considered the presumption to be conclusive, we
remanded for the state court to consider the issue if it so
chose.
In Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570 (1986), we again said that a
Sandstrom error is subject to the harmless-error rule. "Nor
is Sandstrom error equivalent to a directed verdict for the
State. When a jury is instructed to presume malice from
predicate facts, it still must find the existence of those facts
beyond a reasonable doubt. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460
U. S. 73, 96-97 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting). In many
cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so
that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed
the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury. . . . In that event the erroneous instruction is simply
superfluous: the jury has found, in Winship's words, 'every
fact necessary' to establish every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Rose, supra, at 580-581 (footnote
and citations omitted). We also observed that although we
have the authority to make the harmless error determination
ourselves, we do not ordinarily do so. Hence, we remanded
the case for the lower court to make that determination in the
first instance.
We follow the same course here and reverse the judgment
of the California court without deciding here whether no rational jury could find the predicate acts but fail to find the
fact presumed. Ibid. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Department is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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for cfiminal trials." Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U. S.
607, <514 (1946). "Findings made by a judge cannot cure deficiencies m the jury'sfindingsas to the guilt or innocence of a
judgment.
defendant resulting from the court's failure to instruct it to
I agr£e ^th the Court that the decision below must be re- find jtn element of the crime." Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U. S.
versed, and that it is sensible to permit the state court to con- 376, 384-385 (1986).
duet harmless-error analysis in the first instance. I write
'Ypese pfxncip\es Tiecessafny crrcumscfit)e trie a^aiia^liftty
separately, however, because the Court has only implicitly of harmless-error analysis when a jury has been instructed to
acknowledged (by quoting the passage that it doesfromRose appl/ a conclusive presumption. If the judge in the present
v. ClarK 478 U. S. 570, 580-681 (1986), see ante, at 4) what case had instructed the jury, "You are to apply a conclusive
should be made explicit—that the harmless-error analysis ap- prestimption that Carella embezzled the rental car if you find
plicable 'm assessing a mandatory conclusive presumption is that he has blue eyes and lives in the United States," it would
wholly unlike the typical form of such analysis. In theusual not patter, for purposes of assuring Carella his jury-trial
case th e harmlessness determination requires consideration righk whether the record contained overwhelming evidence
of 'the trial record as a whole," Unitea States v. Hasting, that he in fact embezzled the car. For nothing in the instruc461 U. s - 499, 509 (1983),' in order to decide whether the
tion would have directed the jury, or even permitted it,
fact supPorted by improperly admitted evidence was in any to consider and apply that evidence in reaching its verdict.
event overwhelmingly established by other evidence, see, And the problem would not be cured by an appellate court's
e . gtf tfilton v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371, 372-373 (1972);
determination that the record evidence unmistakably estabHarriiWton v. California, 395 U. S. 250, 254 (1969). Such lished guilt, for that would represent a finding of fact by
an expensive inquiry would be error here, and I think it im- judges, not by a jury. As with a directed verdict, "the error
portant both to explain why and to describe the mode of anal- in such a case is that the wrong entity judged the defendant
ysis th^t is appropriate. The Court's mere citation of Rose is guilty*" R°$e v- Clark, supra, at 578.
inadequate to those ends, since, for reasons I shall describe,
F<?ur Members of the Court concluded as much in Coninfra, & 5-6* that case itself is ambiguous.
necticut v. Johnson, 460 U. S. 73 (1983) (plurality opinion),
The Court has disapproved the use of mandatory concluwhich considered whether it could be harmless error to insive presumptions not merely because it "'conflicts] with the
struct a jury that "every person is conclusively presumed to
overriding presumption of innocence with which the law enintend the natural and necessary consequences of his act."
dows tl*e accused/" Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, Id., ^ 78. JUSTICE BLACKMUN wrote for the plurality:
*$& {$£>% ^astfxa% McrtmetU N. UmUd StaU%> 3A2. \L SL
^kn erroneous presmnp'tio'n on afosptiwA&em«ft tft ^
246, 275 (1952)), but also because it *"invade[s] [the] factcrime renders irrelevant the evidence on the issue befinding function* which in a criminal case the law assigns
cause the jury may have relied upon the presumption
solely to the jury," 442 U. S., at 523 (quoting United States
rather than upon that evidence. If the jury may have
v. Unit** States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, 446 (1978)).
failed to consider evidence of intent, a reviewing court
The constitutional right to a jury trial embodies "a profound
cannot hold that the error did not contribute to the verjudgment about the way in which law should be enforced and
dict. The fact that the reviewing court may view the
justice administered." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145,
evidence of intent as overwhelming is then simply irrele155 (19&8)- It is a structural guarantee that "reflects] a funvant. To allow a reviewing court to perform the jury's
dament^ decision about the exercise of official power—a refunction of evaluating the evidence of intent, when the
luctant to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of
jury never may have performed that function, would
the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges." Id., at 156.
give too much weight to society's interest in punishing
A defendant may assuredly insist upon observance of this
the guilty and too little weight to the method by which
guarantee even when the evidence against him is so overdecisions of guilt are to be made." Id., at 85-86 (footwhelming as to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
notes omitted).
wn
That is y theCourt has found it constitutionally impermisa
sible fof judge to direct a verdict for the State. See United The plurality therefore determined—I think correctly—that
States v- MartinJLinem, Supply Co.; 430 U. S. 564, 572-573 the i*se °f conclusive presumptions could be harmless error
(1977). That is also why irtCarpenters v. United States, 330 only in those "rare situations" when "the reviewing court
U. S. 3^5 (1947), the Court did not treat as harmless a jury can t?e confident that [such an] error did not play any role in
instruction that mistakenly did not require express authori- the jury's verdict." Id., at 87. The opinion mentioned as
zation or ratification'to hold a* union criminally liable for its amotfg those "rare situations" an instruction establishing a
officers' participation in an antitrust conspiracy—regardless conclusive presumption on a charge of which the defendant
oi Ww overwhelrninfc'the evidence that authorization or ratification in fact existed. ~ We said:
struction establishing a conclusive presumption with regard
"£To matter how strong the evidence may be of an associ- to an element of the crime that the defendant in any case adation's or organization's participation through its agents mitted. Ibid.
Another basis forfindinga conclusive-presumption instrucin the conspiracy, there must be a charge to the jury setting out correctly the limited liability under [the Norris- tion harmless explains our holding two Terms ago in Pope v.
LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70] of such association or orga- Illinois, 481 U. S. 497 (1987). Although the error in instrucnisation for acts^of its..agents.-* For a judge may not tion held to be harmless there was not a conclusive presumpdirect a verdict of guilty no matter how conclusive the tion but rather misdescription of an element of the offense,
evidence., There is no way of,knowing here whether the the latter like the former deprives the jury of its factfinding
jury's verdict was.based on facts within the condemned role, and must be analyzed similarly. (Thus, as noted earlier,
instructions... or on actual authorization or ratification misdescription of an element of the offense has similarly been
0 f such acts . . . ." Id., at 408-409 (footnotes omitted).
held not curable by overwhelming record evidence of guilt.
In other words, "the question is not whether guilt may be See Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S., at 408-409.) In
spelt out of a record, but whether guilt has been found by a both convictions at issue in Pope the juries had been injury according to the procedure and standards appropriate structed to apply a "community standar[d]" in deciding
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE
MARSHALL* and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in the
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*T allegedly obscene magazines, "'taken as a whole,
5&rious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.'"
'V&S. at 498-499 (citation omitted). The Court con£*however, that the First Amendment required a dif§%riding: "whether a reasonable person wouldfindsuch
i ^ t h e material, taken as a whole." 481 U. S., at 501.

peyond a reasonable doubt. . . . In many cases, the
predicate facts conclusively establish intent so that
jio rational jury could find that the defendant committed
£he relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury. . . . In that event . . . the jury has found . . .
<every fact necessary* to establish every element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt." ld.s at 580-581
(emphasis in original).

%dmg necessary to convict the defendants, the Court
%t the error was harmless. I joined that opinion only •pj^ passage suggests the mode of analysis just discussed in
{Tl believed that no rational juror could plausibly have
com) ection with Pope. Were that all which Rose contained
ffoie magazines utterly lacking in value under a commu- o n foe subject, or were the Court willing to make explicit
h/indard and come to a different conclusion under a rea- t^j. the more usual harmless-error analysis does not apply,
fp person standard. See id., at 504 (SCALIA, J., contoda/ s ° P ^ o n could be regarded as terse but not misleadV). In an appropriate case, a similar analysis could
fa~ Elsewhere, however, Rose says that usual harmlessthe conclusion of harmless error for a conclusive preerrof analysis is applicable: "Where a reviewing court can
lum: When the predicate facts relied upon in the infod that the record developed at trial establishes guilt begjiSh, or other facts necessarily found by the jury, are
yon( J a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been
K ^ ^ l y related to the ultimate fact to be presumed that no
g i f t e d and the judgment should be affirmed," 478 U. S.f at
Bj&g^l jury could find those facts without alsofindingthat
579. see id., at 583. I therefore think it at best misleading to
ISggjdJe fact, making thosefindingsis functionally equivalent suggest without qualification that Rose governs here.
n5i^£ ^ e e * e m e n t require to be presumed. The error
gven if dose's more expansive description of the sort of
iless because it is "beyond a reasonable doubt," Chap- jiar^iless-error analysis available is accepted with regard to
j-py, California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967), that the jury the tyPe °f presumption at issue in that case—a rebuttable
« j | ^ h e facts necessary to support the conviction,
pre$umption—it need not (and for the reasons discussed
^Court's opinion does not discuss any of this precedent,
a]30ve can not) be accepted for conclusive presumptions such
ffhe
gjjferjies exclusively upon citation of, and quotation from, ag tJiat in the present case. The Rose jury, instructed re5g$f^T Clark.* See ante, at 4. In that case we acknowlgarding a rebuttable presumption of malice, could—indeed,
ffiSS the possibility of harmless error (and remanded for
w a s compelled to—weigh the relevant evidence and decide
JgS^ination of that issue) with respect to an instruction
w h e ther the presumption had been overcome. It had made
a fading regarding the elemental fact, and the only difficulty
jgggkj. that a killing has occurred, then it is presumed that the w a $ that the burden of proof had been placed upon the deStejiw was done maliciously. But this presumption may be
fend*^ rather than the State. It is one thing to say that the
gutted
" 478 U. S., at 574. In explaining why the
effect of this erroneous burden-shifting will be disregarded if
fee of ^ ^permissible presumption, unlike the granting of a
"th# r e c o r d developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reajjjj^^d verdict for the State, can in some circumstances be
son^ble doubt"; it is quite another to say that the jury's failfoeeme^ harmless error, we observed:
ure to make any factual determination of the elemental fact—
trfThen a jury is instructed to presume malicefrompredi- beC2Use of a conclusive presumption resting upon findings
cate facts, it still must find the existence of those facts
t h a t do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt the element s fact—will be similarly disregarded.
jror these reasons, I concur only in the judgment of the
&Sanfc t r o m v* Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979), is also cited, see ante, at
y
r on y
8 but o^ (° * Property) for the proposition that we need not conduct
Cot^
€rror
htrmle£*~
analysis ourselves, not for the proposition that harmlesserror aj^ysk « applicable. In Sandttrom we Mdecline[d] to reach" not
oily th^ State's claim that the flawed instruction "constituted harmless
error,"fruta^so l ^ e defendant's claim that "in any event an unconstitutional
Jury instruction on an element of the crime can never constitute harmless
fggg^m 442 U.S., at 626-527.
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